TVPPA report: Part IV of assessment
This is the fourth article in the series on TVPPA’s (Tennessee Valley Public Power Association) assessment of the Holly Springs Electric Department.
The report goes further indepth into the findings and recommendations TVPPA submitted to the Holly Springs Utility Department.
The assessment was paid for by an appropriation of $500,000 to the Tennessee Valley Authority to help improve conditions at the electric department, which include reliability of service to customers, safety and improving utility operations.
Reliability indices collection and uses
Standard 1:
TVPPA failed to find any evidence during the assessment that the Holly Springs Utility Department is capturing data to be used to determine reliability using industry accepted measurement.
The System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI), which records how many hours a year the average customer is out of power or the number of outages an average customer experiences a year, was not demonstrated. These two measurements provide a clear picture of reliability of a system and key elements to determine necessary improvements. Other indices that could be used were not found.
Standard 2:
A utility can provide the most recent year’s calculation of reliability data it has tracked. HSUD could not provide the tracking of reliability data for the most recent year.
Reliability Indices Use
Standard 1: The utility uses service reliability to maintain and improve utility operations.
There was no evidence HSUD captured data to determine reliability using industry-wide accepted measurements. Added to this, the assessment found no reliable mapping system was in use and there were problems with the metering system. That left no reliable way to determine how many customers were without power at any given time.
The report said there were many times outages are restored in sections in lieu of using an “all at once” approach that leads to misunderstanding of the number of customers with and without power restoration.
Tracking data captured year by year paints a necessary picture into how the utility is progressing towards minimizing both the number and size of outages on the system. Currently HSUD does not collect or initiate the use of such data to have the ability to make these determinations.
The standard allows a utility to be considered in compliance with the standard if six of thirteen suggested American Public Power Association’s RP3 (reliable public power provider) leading practices are consistently and uniformly demonstrated.
The report said HSUD performs very little maintenance on its system, which is clearly beginning to be seen through increased outages even on clear days.
The utility appeared to be operating on a dayto- day basis and unable to handle the number of reported concerns and the amount of work required.
Vegetation management ensuring lines are clear was one example the report cited as evidence where maintenance of the system was lacking to reduce outages.
Further, there was no evidence to support compliance with regional, national, or APPA’s ereliability tracker benchmarking survey or that the service was used in the past year.
Mutual Aid
HSUD provided evidence it does have mutual aid agreements with some other utilities and can provides one form as documentation of a mutual aid program. The document appeared to be adequate for the intended purpose.
Disaster Plan
There was no one document found that could be considered a functioning disaster or emergency response plan. Some elements that would be included in a disaster or emergency response plan were found. But these elements do not exist as a formal, approved document.
HSUD does not have a formal assessment approach to deal with widespread damage. However, the procedure for addressing small or medium outages was provided to the assessment team. HSUD crews said the first step used to restoring power is to trace the circuit from the substation to the first known case of trouble.
If damage is found during the tracing protocol, crews will stop, repair the damaged line, ensure power is restored, then move on down the tracing line to find the next possible source of damage.
The utility has an employee list on the break room wall at HSUD. Outside HSUD personnel have phone numbers of HSUD personnel.
An application exists to allow an employee to access company issued cell phones and a list of critical customers. The list of critical customers was not current.
Critical customers included hospital/nursing homes and individual customers.
Customers are required to provide medical proof of in-home life support services in order to be placed on the critical customer list. But no reliable process to periodically verify a medical situation still exists was in place.
The assessment was unable to find a formal list/contact list of suppliers in a disaster plan. There was no procedure in place for prearrangements for fueling, lodging, or restaurants for mutual aid crews.
The study found most mutual aid crews are from nearby utilities. They drive back home at the end of the workday. This works when nearby mutual aid crews are in close proximity during each disaster event. If this is not the case, information and coordinations services should be readily available.
There is no Emergency Operations Center location listed in a disaster plan.
Utility disaster plans include radio/communication policies and plans.
Most communication is done via cell phones, even though the radio system does not appear to be the first choice over the use of cell phones, the report said.
Cell phones use alone can be problematic due to service interruptions or inability of a crew member to hear. This form of communication can lead to safety issues.
A formal plan to show mutual aid crews how lines are fed, where to obtain supplies, and who will be providing communication to these crews during the repair process is a significant area of concern. Mutual aid crews are not provided with mapping or radio communication devices.
There was no single document that is considered a functioning disaster or emergency response plan at HSUD that would detail the utility’s role in a coordinated process with other governmental or non-governmental agencies/utilities.
A list of supply chain contacts to be called in event of a disaster was found. A comprehensive and vetted list of suppliers and contractors was not found, nor were pre-approved storm contracts with tree or line contractors available.
There was no formal document found detailing those responsible for coordinating communications between HSUD and its employees with government agencies, the public, or the media on restoration efforts. Without a formal detailed plan, communication can be thwarted creating misunderstandings of purpose, and hinder organizational efforts.
An updated priority list of health care providers was not found.
Periodic disaster drills were not documented. No documents of drills conducted periodically for events such as earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, fires or tornados were found.
Nor were there documents of drills to prepare for acts of terrorism, cyber security threats or workplace violence.